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This paper develops an analytical framework to explore how ￿nan-
cial sector characteristics shape domestic debt dynamics in emerging
market economies. Our analysis suggests that the more competitive
the banking sector and the more liquid and deeper the deposit market,
the better would be the conditions in the public securities market. Our
results also reveal that the lower the ￿nancial depth, the greater the
scale of private sector credits that are crowded-out by public borrow-
ing. To the extent that credit availability is associated with improved
productivity and better output performance, the lack of ￿nancial depth
in emerging market countries implies that extensive domestic borrow-
ing in these countries may have consequences far beyond the concern
with ￿scal sustainability. As such, our results higlight the importance
of developing domestic debt markets for ￿nancial and macroeconomic
stability.
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11 Introduction
The past decade has been a challenging time for policy-makers in a large
number of emerging market countries. Starting with the Tequila crisis in
1994, authorities in a group of Asian countries, Russia, Argentina, Turkey
and Brazil were faced with collapsing currencies which were followed by
￿nancial crises with serious economy-wide consequences. Interestingly, cur-
rency collapses were also experienced by some industrial countries during the
1990s -most notably in Western Europe with the ERM (European exchange
rate mechanism) crises in 1992 and 1993- where the recovery was fast and
relatively painless. A closer look at these experiences highlights important
di⁄erences in the institutional framework of ￿nancial systems in emerging
market countries from those of the developed countries (see, for example,
Bleaney, 2005). Indeed, there is now a broad consensus that the fragilities
in the functioning of the banking and ￿nancial systems in emerging market
countries have played a crucial role in turning these currency collapses into
full-blown ￿nancial crises.
One common feature of the functioning of the ￿nancial system in emerg-
ing market countries is that, due to the underdeveloped nature of the bond
and equity markets, ￿nancial intermediation is mostly carried out through
the banking system. Although the signi￿cance of the banking sector has
been declining over the last decade globally, it continues to form a signi￿-
cant part of the ￿nancial structure in many emerging market countries (see,
for example, Abbas and Christensen, 2007 and Das, 2004). A a crucial as-
pect of banks￿￿nancial intermediation is related to their role as the major
lenders to the government due to the lack of well developed domestic debt
markets in these countries. For example, the ratio of domestic debt secu-
rities held by commercial banks was as high as 85.3 per cent in Turkey,
42.73 per cent in Thailand, 25.7 per cent in Hungary and 24.2 per cent in
Israel in 2000.1 It has been argued that these high exposures for national
banking systems result from legal and institutional imperfections in these
countries, which lead to substantial risks being associated with lending to
the private sector (Kumhof and Tanner, 2005). Holding government secu-
rities in such environments is therefore a much safer investment option for
banks, which results in banks being highly exposed to government debt and
thus to macroeconomic shocks.
1These ￿gures are compiled from respective country central bank and treasury web
sources. When expressed as a ratio of the banks￿total assets, net credit to government
ratios around and above 50 per cent are commonly observed in a number of emerging
market countries (Kumhof and Tanner, 2005).
2Another empirical regularity faced by emerging market countries has
been the volatility of international capital ￿ ows into and out of these coun-
tries, as was repeatedly experienced by countries that were hit by crises.
External borrowing which is usually on a short-term basis, puts the au-
thorities at the mercy of the markets as a change in sentiments can lead to
either capital ￿ owing out of the country or renewed borrowing at unfavorable
terms. Given these uncertainties and costs in obtaining external funds it is
clear that a properly functioning internal debt market is crucial for emerging
market countries.2 This is especially the case as the public ￿nances in these
countries are generally characterized by ine¢ cient tax systems, di¢ culties
with tax collection and insu¢ cient tax bases. The resulting short-fall of tax
revenues requires authorities to resort to domestic borrowing on a regular
basis. Moreover, changes in macroeconomic policy-making structures dur-
ing the 1990s -with increased emphasis on price stability and the resulting
shift from monetizing de￿cits- has increased the importance and thus the
size of the debt markets substantially in emerging market countries. The
need to develop domestic securities markets has now been widely recognized
by both the international ￿nancial institutions and national policy-makers.
Such importance of the domestic debt markets for these countries, when
combined with the banking sector￿ s role in ￿nancial intermediation implies
that the banking sector plays a major role in shaping the debt structure in
emerging market countries.
Although the issues of foreign borrowing and the debt problems of devel-
oping countries have been analyzed extensively in the literature, the dynam-
ics of domestic public debt have been a subject of investigation only very
recently (see, for example, Jeanne and Guscina, 2006 and Hanson, 2007).3
Moreover, we are not aware of any existing work, theoretical or empirical,
analyzing the role of the ￿nancial sector in domestic debt dynamics.4 Moti-
vated by the importance and the relevance of the above mentioned issues and
2Hausler et al (2003) report that domestic bond issues by governments are thirteen
times greater than foreign currency issues in emerging market countries. See, also Mihaljek
et al, 2002.
3Two important exceptions are Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and Guidotti and Kumar
(1991). The former studies the empirical determinants of in￿ ation and ￿scal de￿cits in
developing countries while the latter analyzes the evolution of domestic debt and links
between internal and external borrowing. In addition, in a recent paper, Claessen et al
(2003) provide an empirical examination of the determinants of the size and the currency
composition of government bonds for a sample of emerging market and industrialized
countries.
4Similarly, the ￿nancial implications of ￿scal policy have been only recently attracting
attention in formal analyses (see, for example, Christensen, 2005 and Hauner, 2006).
3the lack of work in this area, this paper attempts to provide an examination
of the linkages between the ￿nancial sector and domestic borrowing.
In order to analyze this issue, we develop an analytical framework which
integrates the pro￿t maximizing motives of the ￿nancial sector in lending
to government with the welfare maximizing policy-makers. This is done
using a simple dynamic game theoretic model with three players; mone-
tary and ￿scal authorities and the ￿nancial sector. Interactions between
the two macroeconomic policy-making authorities determine the stance of
policy and thus the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) and the
interactions between the ￿scal authority and the ￿nancial sector determine
the cost of that borrowing. Modelling the motives of the lender as well as
the preferences of the borrower that issues the debt enables us to explore the
determination of both the supply of and the demand for funds available for
borrowing. Our framework allows us to derive a number of policy implica-
tions for countries that heavily rely on domestic debt where the terms of debt
are greatly in￿ uenced by the characteristics of the ￿nancial sector. We ar-
gue that recent changes in macroeconomic policy-making institutions in the
emerging market countries, which often involved the adoption of explicit or
implicit in￿ ation targets, have made it even more important to understand
the dynamics of domestic debt markets. This is because a well-functioning
domestic securities market reduces the need for monetary ￿nancing that is
instrumental for successful implementation of any in￿ ation targeting regime.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic model. Section 3 presents the characterization of equilibrium and
analyzes both the ￿nancial and institutional determinants of the cost of
borrowing. The basic model is extended to incorporate the possibility of
banks￿lending to the non-public sector in Section 4. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 The Basic Model
Policy makers￿preferences
In order to analyze the interactions between the policy-making authori-
ties and the ￿nancial sector we utilize a simple model of discretionary mon-
etary and ￿scal policy-making.5 The model speci￿es a two-period game
5Similar variants of this model are used by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), Ozkan
(2000) and Ismihan and Ozkan (2004). Unlike in our paper, however, the framework
utilized by these studies excludes the ￿nancial sector.
4with monetary and ￿scal authorities and the banking sector. Now consider










2 + (xt ￿ xt)2 + ￿2(gt ￿ gt)2] (1)
where LG
t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the government, ￿1 and
￿2 represent, respectively, the government￿ s relative dislikes for the devia-
tions of in￿ ation (￿t) and public spending as a share of output (gt) from
their target levels (0 and gt respectively) relative to the deviations of output
(xt) from its target level (xt) and ￿G is the government￿ s discount factor.









2 + (xt ￿ xt)2] (2)
where LCB
t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the CB, ￿1 is the CB￿ s
in￿ ation stability weight, ￿CB is the CB￿ s discount factor. In addition, the
CB is more conservative than the elected government; ￿1 > ￿1 and it does
not discount the future at as a high rate as the elected government; ￿CB
> ￿G. Since the CB does not have any target for public spending, no terms
relating to gt enter the CB￿ s loss function.
As is seen from equations (1) and (2) policy-makers￿welfare losses in-
crease in the deviations of in￿ ation, output and public spending from their
target levels (or ￿ bliss￿points). As is standard, the target level of in￿ ation
is taken to be zero to indicate the desirability of price stability. A non-zero
output target represents the bliss point for output in the absence of non-tax
distortions, for example, due to labour or commodity market imperfections.
The bliss point for public spending can be interpreted as the optimal share
of non-distortionary output to be spent on public spending. Both weights
￿1;￿1, ￿2 and the bliss points for output and public spending; xt and gt
re￿ ect the political and the institutional structure of the economy.
Output is given by the following production function: Yt = N
￿
t , where
Yt and Nt represent output and labor respectively, in period t and 0 <
￿ < 1. Distortionary taxes, which are the only form of taxes available
to the government, are levied on output at the rate ￿t. A representative
competitive ￿rm￿ s problem is to maximize pro￿ts Pt(1 ￿ ￿t)N
￿
t ￿ WtNt,
5where Pt and Wt represent the price level and the wage rate respectively,
in period t. A representative competitive ￿rm chooses labor to maximize
pro￿ts by taking Pt,Wt and ￿t as given. The resulting output supply function
is yt = ￿(pt ￿ wt ￿ ￿t) + z; where lower case letters represent logs, e.g.
yt = ln(Yt); ￿ = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿); and z = ￿ln(￿).6 Normalizing output by
subtracting z from yt; for simplicity and utilizing wt = pe
t yields the following
normalized output supply function:
xt = ￿(￿t ￿ ￿e
t ￿ ￿t) (3)
where ￿e
t is expected in￿ ation and all other variables are as de￿ned above.
Demand for funds
Government is in charge of ￿scal policy-making while monetary policy
decisions are taken by an independent CB. The budget constraint creates
the link between the policies chosen by the CB and the ￿scal authority.
Public expenditures are ￿nanced by tax revenues, money creation and the
debt issued by the government. The government, thus, faces the following
budget constraint at time t:
gt + (1 + rt￿1)dt￿1 = ￿t + k￿t + dt (4)
where dt￿1 denotes the amount of single-period debt issued (as a ratio
of output) in period t ￿ 1 and to be re-paid in period t, rt￿1 represents the
rate at which it is borrowed; dt is the new debt issue in period t and k is the
real money holdings as share of output.7 All other variables are as de￿ned
earlier.
6Note that ln(1 ￿ ￿) ’ ￿￿.
7Equation (4) suggests that all debt is indexed. In the presence of non-indexed debt,
surprise in￿ ation would erode the real value of the government￿ s obligations providing
a further incentive for surprise in￿ ation. We are excluding this possibility by focusing
on indexed debt. One motivation for this is the increasing reliance on indexed debt
instruments in emerging market countries where this incentive has been traditionally more
important. For example, in 2001 the ratio of indexed bonds -including foreign currency
denominated ones- in the total domestically issued government bonds was 90 per cent in
Chile, 86 per cent in Turkey, 81 per cent in Brazil and 79 per cent in Mexico (see, for
example, Borensztein et al, 2004).
It should be noted that, however, all our results under non-cooperative monetary and
￿scal policymaking -as is maintained in our benchmark model- hold also in the presence
of non-indexed debt.
6It follows that the borrowing requirement, dt would be determined by
the preferences of the monetary and ￿scal policy-makers as described above
and the interactions between the two. In order to focus on the interactions
between the ￿nancial sector and the government in determining the terms
of domestic borrowing, we abstract from issues of capital in￿ ows and foreign
debt dynamics that are beyond the scope of this paper.
In what follows, we ￿rst treat dt as the total demand for funds in this
economy. This simpli￿cation is based on the experiences of a number of
emerging market countries. For example, public sector bonds accounted for
well over 80 per cent of the total domestic debt issued in Brazil, Mexico and
Hungary and as much as 100 per cent in Turkey, Poland and Russia as of
September 2000 (see, IBRD and IMF, 2001, p.3).8
Section 4 relaxes this assumption by extending the basic model to incor-
porate banks￿lending to the private sector.
Supply of loanable funds
Now we turn to the determination of the supply of loanable funds avail-
able to the government. The importance of banks as dominant buyers of
government paper in emerging market countries was discussed above. As
explained, this is mainly due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of the
￿nancial markets in these countries, resulting in banks playing a major role
in mobilizing savings for the use of governments. Stable interest income on
government securities makes them attractive for banks that can use these
securities to balance more volatile investments (see, IBRD and IMF, 2001).
Given the dominance of banks as investors in government securities, in what
follows the banking sector is taken to be the main lender.
Consider a ￿nancial sector that is composed of n banks. Banks compete
with each other both in collecting deposits and in lending the collected funds.
In the deposit market, the relationship between the deposit rate o⁄ered by
















t is the deposit supply facing bank i, rzi
t is the deposit rate
o⁄ered by bank i and A and ￿ are constants characterizing the structure of
the deposit market.
8Moreover, Hauner (2006) reports that the share of bank credit absorbed by the public
sector in emerging market countries has been rising rapidly over the last decade.
















t is bank i￿ s pro￿t function at time t, bi
t is the bank i￿ s bond
holdings of government securities, rt is the rate of interest on these securities
and c is the cost associated with illiquidity.9 These costs are assumed to
increase at an increasing rate as illiquidity increases. One explanation for
this is that, as a result of illiquidity, banks may have to borrow from the cen-
tral bank￿ s discount window which may prove increasingly costly. Given the
dominance of government debt in total securities traded in emerging mar-
kets, lending to the government through the purchase of bonds is treated as
the only form of lending for the banks (this assumption is relaxed in Section
4). The maximum that a bank can lend is then the di⁄erence between the
amount of deposits that it collects and the amount that it needs to hold as
required reserves. This ratio is captured by ￿ in equation (6).10
In addition to deciding on the deposit rate, ri
t; the representative bank
also chooses how much to lend to the government, bi
t, which determines the
demand for bonds. This will clearly depend upon the return on government
bonds as well as on the reserves requirement ratio and the cost of illiquidity.
3 Characterization of Equilibrium
3.1 Solution in t=2
Once the second period of this game is reached, the equilibrium values of
in￿ ation, taxes, government expenditures and public debt issued in t=1
are known to all agents. In t=2 the ￿scal authority pays back the amount
borrowed in t=1, and therefore, the banking sector does not have an explicit
role to play in t=2. As a result, the strategic decision making in this period
involves only two players.












10This suggests that the reserve requirement ratio can be expressed as (1 ￿ ￿):








2 + (x2 ￿ x2)
2 + ￿2(g2 ￿ g2)2
i
(8)
The government budget constraint in t = 2 is given by:
g2 + (1 + r1)d1 = ￿2 + k￿2 (9)
where d1 is the debt issued in period t = 1 that should be paid back in
period t = 2, r1 is the ex ante real interest rate.11 Equation (9) suggests
that resources required to pay for public outlays -current spending and the
debt service- come from taxes and seigniorage in t = 2.
The government and the CB choose their choice variables simultaneously,
leading to a Nash equilibrium. The resulting in￿ ation in t=2 is given by
￿2 = (￿2e ￿=￿1)(x2=￿ + g2 + (1 + r1)d1) (10)
where e ￿ = 1=(1 + e ’); and e ’ = ￿2
￿2 + k￿2
￿1 .
Clearly, non-zero levels of both output and public spending targets form
part of the in￿ ationary bias. The higher are these targets the higher is
current in￿ ation. In addition, a rise in public borrowing in the previous
period leads to higher in￿ ation.
Similarly, equilibrium levels of taxes and public expenditure in t = 2 are
given by:
￿2 = (￿2e ￿=￿2)[g2 + (1 + r1)d1] + ((￿2e ￿=￿2) ￿ 1)x2=￿ (11)
and
g2 = e ￿(e ’g2 ￿ (1 + r1)d1 ￿ x2=￿) (12)
As is clear from (11) and (12), a rise in debt re-payments requires higher
taxation whilst restricting the policy-makers￿ability to expand other spend-
ing, thus requiring a fall in public spending in equilibrium.
11While seigniorage revenues, k￿t tend to be negligible in industrial economies, emerging
market countries with less developed ￿nancial systems routinely resort to seigniorage as a
source of revenue (see, for example, IMF, 2001).
93.2 Solution in t=1
In period t = 1 the banking sector chooses the amount of government bonds
to hold and, therefore, directly in￿ uences the strategic choices facing the
government. The ￿scal authority now makes three decisions; how much to
spend, how much to tax and how much to borrow. Since taxes are distor-
tionary higher current borrowing enables the policy-maker to lower current
taxes, which leads to lower distortions now but at the expense of higher
distortions in the next period and vice versa.
Demand for borrowing
As in t = 2; government and the independent CB play a Nash game in
t = 1: CB chooses ￿1 to minimize 1
2[￿1￿2
1 + (x1 ￿ x1)2]. The government
chooses ￿1;g1 and d1 to minimize its intertemporal loss function as given
in (1). Formally, by substituting the equilibrium values from t = 2 and
output supply function into the intertemporal loss function in t = 1, the






1 + (￿(￿1 ￿ ￿e
1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ x1)2 + ￿2(g1 ￿ g1)2] + ￿G(￿2=2) e D
(x2=￿ + g2 + (1 + r1)d1)2 + ￿1(g1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ k￿1 ￿ d1) (13)







Di⁄erentiating (13) w.r. to the choice variables, imposing the rational
expectations condition and then combining the ￿rst order conditions from
the CB￿ s and the government￿ s loss minimization problems and re-arranging
yields the borrowing requirement in t = 1 :






x2 + (1 + r0)d0] (14)
where ￿ = 1
1+(1+r1)z;z = (1+e ’) e D￿ and e D￿ = (1+r1)￿FA e D: Appendix
A provides the details of this derivation and lists the equilibrium values of
other variables in t = 1.
As is seen from (14), the demand for borrowing (the supply of bonds)
is de￿ned in terms of the borrowing rate, r1; as well as the spending and
output targets and the scale of initial borrowing.
10Supply of lending
The supply of lending to the government (demand for bonds), on the
other hand, is determined as an outcome of each bank￿ s own pro￿t maxi-
















1 is the amount that bank i is willing to hold as bonds, i.e. the
amount that it is willing to lend to the government in t=1. Taking the bond
rate and the deposit rate o⁄ered by all other banks as given, bank i chooses
its own deposit rate and the amount of bond holdings to maximize pro￿ts.




































































5 = 0 (17)
Equations (16) and (17) suggest that bank i￿ s choice of the deposit rate,
rzi
1 and the scale of its lending to the government, bi
1; depend upon the







1 for all j: (18)
Substituting (18) into the FOCs and re-arranging yields the following
demand for bonds on the part of bank i
11bi
1 =
[(c￿2 + c￿n1)￿2 + nn1 + 2n￿]r1 + (￿ + n1)cA￿
cn(n1 + 2￿)
(19)
where n1 = !(n ￿ 1)n.
The expression for bi
1 in (19) is bank i￿ s demand for bond holdings in
terms of the bond rate, r1. As expected, this is an increasing function of the
bond rate, @bi
1=@r1 > 0 for n > 1: Clearly, this relationship is shaped by the
number of banks operating in the ￿nancial system, n; the scale of the costs
of illiquidity, c and the determinants of the deposit supply, A and ￿ as well
as the reserve requirements, (1 ￿ ￿).
3.3 Determination of the Cost of Borrowing
Let us now turn to the determination of the bond rate, r1 by combining the
banks￿total demand for bonds, b1 = nbi
1; with the government￿ s demand
for borrowing (supply of bonds), d1. The bond rate adjusts till the demand
for bonds, b1 is exactly matched by its supply d1, thereby eliminating any
excess demand for borrowing and thus any excess supply of bonds. More
formally, in equilibrium
Ed
1(r1) = d1(r1) ￿ b1(r1) = 0 (20)
where Ed
1(r1) denotes excess demand for borrowing expressed in terms
of the bond rate and d1(r1) and b1(r1); are, respectively the demand for
borrowing (supply of bonds) and the demand for bonds. As presented above,
d1(r1) is also a function of a number of political and institutional factors
while b1(r1) is a function of ￿nancial characteristics of the banking sector.
Utilizing (14) and (19) from above, representing d1(r1) and b1(r1) re-
spectively, (20) can now be expressed as
Ed
1(r1) = ￿[g1 ￿ zg2 + 1
￿x1 ￿ z
￿x2 + (1 + r0)d0]￿
[(c￿2 + c￿n1)￿2 + nn1 + 2n￿]r1 + (￿ + n1)cA￿
c(n1 + 2￿)
= 0 (21)
Solving (21) for r1 yields the equilibrium bond rate (the details of solving
(21) for r1 is presented in Appendix B).
The following section analyzes the determinants of the equilibrium bond
rate which we interpret as the cost of public borrowing.
123.3.1 The Role of the Financial Characteristics of the Banking
Sector
Competition in the banking sector
As discussed above, the banking sector￿ s predominant role in the gov-
ernment securities market is a main source of ￿nancial fragility in emerging
market countries. It is, therefore, not surprising that a commonly proposed
policy measure to develop domestic capital markets in these countries has
been the enhancement of the investor base to deepen the demand for (all)
securities. The same reasoning also applies to the structure of competition
in the banking sector when it is the only or the dominant source of demand
for government securities. More speci￿cally, having a greater number of
banks would reduce the pressure in the securities market by extending the
supply of credits. This argument can be formalized as follows.
Result 1. The greater the competition in the banking sector, that is the
greater is n; the lower the cost of public borrowing.
Proof 1. Di⁄erentiating b1 w.r.to n yields, @b1
@n = [(2n ￿ 1)(c￿A!￿ +
c￿2￿2!r1)+(n ￿ 2)n3!2r1 +r1n2!2 +4r1￿2 +4r1￿n1]=[c(n1 +2￿)2]: Given
that n = 2 and bi
1; c; ￿ , A and r1 are all non-negative, it follows that
@b1






@b1 < 0; it is straightforward to establish that
@r1
@n < 0:
Recent research suggests that one way to increase competition in the
banking sector is through foreign bank participation. There has been a sub-
stantial increase in the level of foreign bank control in most emerging market
countries and a resulting rise in competitive pressures in their banking sec-
tors during the 1990s (Gelos and Roldos, 2004).
Features of the deposit market
The previous section discussed the e⁄ect of extending the investor base
on the functioning of the domestic securities market. One important source
of this demand for securities is obviously the depth of liquidity banks face
in the deposit market. It therefore follows that the deeper a country￿ s de-
posit base, the better able are its banks in channelling resources towards
meeting the public sector￿ s borrowing requirements. It might usefully be
noted here that in emerging markets during the 1990s, there were sharp
rises in government bond issues the same time as signi￿cant increases in
13bank deposits.12;13
Utilizing our framework, this link between deposit market and the terms
of borrowing can be established as follows.
Result 2. The deeper the deposit market, that is the higher is A and/or
￿; the lower the cost of public borrowing.
Proof 2. The derivative of b1 w.r.to A is @b1
@A =
￿(￿+n1)
(n1+2￿): Given that (n￿
1) > 0 and all other parameters are non-negative, @b1
@A > 0: Thus, similar to
under Proof 1, it can be established that @r1
@A < 0 since @b1
@A > 0 and @r1
@b1 < 0:
Likewise, the derivative of b1 w.r.to ￿ is @b1
@￿ = ￿[(n ￿ 2)r1￿!2n3+2r1￿￿n1+
r1￿!2n2 +2r1￿￿2 +(n￿n2)A!]=(n1 +2￿)2: It can then be established that
@b1
@￿ > 0 for n = 2 and (n ￿ 2)r1￿!2n3+2r1￿￿n1+r1￿!2n2+2r1￿￿2 > An1:
Costs of illiquidity
Another factor that is likely to impact upon the availability of funds in
the banking sector is the cost of illiquidity. Clearly, the higher the cost of
obtaining funds, the lower would be the bank￿ s demand for holding govern-
ment securities. This relationship between the cost of illiquidity and demand
for government bonds may be especially strong during ￿nancial crises when
obtaining liquidity is particularly di¢ cult and/or costly.14
By utilizing the above proposed model, this relationship can be stated
more formally as follows.
Result 3. The greater the cost of illiquidity, the lower the demand for
government bonds and, therefore, the higher the terms of borrowing for the
government.
Proof 3. The derivative of b1 w.r.to c is @b1
@c = ￿r1n
c2 : Clearly, @b1
@c is un-
ambiguously negative given that both n and c are non-negative parameters.
Thus @r1
@b1 < 0 establishes that @r1
@c > 0:
12Hanson (2003) reports that bank deposits as a percentage of GDP rose from an average
of 35 per cent in 1990 to above 50 per cent in 2000 in emerging market countries.
13Indeed, Claessen et al (2003) use the ratio of the total deposit base over nominal GDP
as a proxy for the demand for government bonds in investigating the size and currency
composition of government bonds in a sample of both developed and developing countries.
14For example, during the ￿nancial crisis in Turkey in 2000, the severe liquidity squeeze
in the banking sector resulted in interest rates on a 12-month government bond jumping
to nearly 82 per cent in December 2000 from just over 32 per cent in July 2000.
14Reserve requirements
In some countries banks are regularly subjected to reserve requirements
that are used as a monetary policy tool. Given the importance of banking
system￿ s characteristics for the functioning of the domestic securities market
in emerging market economies, changes in the reserve ratio would clearly
impact upon the borrowing conditions. More speci￿cally, the greater the
reserve requirements, the smaller the pool of funds available for government
borrowing, thus the less favourable would be the terms of borrowing. Result
4 below formalizes this relationship.15
Result 4. The higher the reserve requirement, the greater is (1 ￿ ￿); the
higher the cost of public borrowing.
Proof 4. Di⁄erentiating b1 w.r.to ￿ yields @b1
@￿ = (￿+n1)(A+2￿￿r1)=(n1+




3.3.2 The Role of Macroeconomic and Institutional Factors
We now turn to the demand for borrowing and analyze the role of macro-
economic and institutional factors on the bond rate working through the
demand side.
The initial level of indebtedness
It is widely recognized that ￿scal discipline is a pre-condition for ￿nancial
stability. In countries where there is a long history of lax ￿scal stance
resulting in high levels of existing government liabilities, further borrowing
is highly likely to be at unfavourable terms. Indeed, the existence of high
domestic debt levels is commonly viewed as an important early warning
signal for ￿nancial crises (see, for example, Kaminsky et al, 1998).
The framework we developed above clearly highlights the link between
the extent of existing public indebtedness and the terms of newly issued
securities.
15Note that this is based on the assumption that government securities cannot be used to
meet reserve requirements. However, there are provisions in some countries that allow the
use of these securities as part of the regulatory reserve requirements. Clearly, when that
is the case, a rise in these requirements would encourage greater holdings of government
securities thereby improving the terms of borrowing for governments.
15Result 5. The higher the initial scale of public debt, d0, the higher the
cost of current public borrowing, r1.
Proof 5. The derivative of d1 with respect to d0 is (1+r0)￿: Given that




Policy-maker￿ s time preference and political instability
An important aspect of policy-making structure is related to the govern-
ment￿ s time preference. Policy-makers who discount future heavily would
be less concerned about the distortionary e⁄ects of servicing the debt in
future and would thus resort to borrowing more often. This would, in turn,
have an unfavourable impact on the terms of borrowing, leading to higher
interest rates. Conversely, a high discount factor implies greater importance
being attached future, characterizing a government more concerned about
the implications of current borrowing on future distortions. The resulting
lower borrowing would lower the rates at which such borrowing is secured.
These arguments are formalized in the following.
Result 6. The lower the incumbent government￿ s subjective discount fac-
tor, ￿FA, the higher the equilibrium cost of public borrowing.




￿x1+(1+r0)d0)]: Given that all parameters in this ex-
pression are positive this derivative is unambiguously negative. It, therefore,
straightforwardly follows that @r1
@￿FA < 0:
Such a link between the time preference of the policy-maker and the
terms of its borrowing suggests that political instability, which is prevalent
in many of the less developed and emerging market economies, may have
important implications for the dynamics of public borrowing in these coun-
tries. Greater political instability prepares the ground for more ￿ impatient￿
policy-makers who would be reluctant to raise taxes that would increase the
current distortions, making them more likely to resort to additional borrow-
ing with unfavourable consequences for the terms of borrowing.16
16See, Edwards and Tabellini (1991) for formal empirical evidence on the link between
political instability and public ￿nances in developing countries.
16The independence and the conservativeness of the central bank
In the model analyzed above the CB operates independently of the polit-
ical authority. While this may be a good representation of policy-making in,
for example, Eurozone countries or the US, where CBs have a considerable
degree of independence from the political authorities, this is not the case in
many emerging market countries notwithstanding the recent moves towards
more independent monetary policy-making in these countries. Rogo⁄(2003)
shows that although CB institutions and independence universally improved
during the last decade, industrial countries still dominate emerging market
ones on both fronts. This suggests that other policy-making arrangements
where the government has a more dominant role in the determination of both
monetary and ￿scal instruments may still be relevant for some developing
countries.
In order to assess the role of CB independence on the cost of domestic
borrowing, equilibrium debt levels under an independent central banking
arrangement- as was analyzed above- and under the centralized framework
where a government chooses both monetary and ￿scal instruments should
be compared. These are provided, respectively, by (22) and (23)
dCCB






x2 + (1 + r0)d0] (22)
dG






x2 + (1 + r0)d0] (23)
where dCCB
1 and dG
1 denote, respectively, the equilibrium borrowing un-
der an independent and conservative CB and under the centralized outcome
where G is used to denote the government. Also, ￿￿ = 1
1+(1+r1)z￿;z￿ =















Result 7. Delegating monetary policy-making powers to an independent
and conservative CB leads to a higher public debt in equilibrium, dCCB
1 >
dG
1 ; and therefore raises the cost of borrowing, rCCB
1 > rG
1 .
Proof 7. For dCCB
1 to be greater than dG
1 , both ￿ > ￿￿ and ￿z < ￿￿z￿
should hold. The requirement for both of these conditions is for ￿1 to be
17greater than ￿1
k+1. Given that the CB is more conservative than the elected
government, ￿1 > ￿1; and k, money holdings as a ratio of output is positive,
k > 0; this condition is guaranteed and thus dCCB
1 > dG
1 . Since @r1=@d1 > 0;
it can easily be established that rCCB
1 > rG
1 :
The above result follows from the fact that delegating monetary policy-
making to an independent CB lowers in￿ ation in t = 1. This, in turn,
reduces the seigniorage revenues and therefore induces a rise in public bor-
rowing as an alternative source of ￿nance in t = 1, with unfavorable impli-
cations for the cost of borrowing, r1. Such a link between lower in￿ ation
and higher public borrowing would obviously be stronger in emerging mar-
ket countries where seigniorage revenues are still an important source of
revenue (see, for example, IMF, 2001).
Result 7 can also be extended to the e⁄ect of the CB￿ s conservativeness,
￿: Verifying Result 7 above suggested that the greater ￿, the greater the
di⁄erence between the scale of borrowing under an independent CB and
the centralized outcome. This is because a more conservative CB -one
with greater in￿ ation aversion- achieves a lower in￿ ation in equilibrium,
thereby creating a larger gap to be ￿nanced. The resulting higher borrowing
requirement, in turn, raises the cost of borrowing.
This result is in line with recent ￿ndings that granting independence
to central banks alone is not su¢ cient to alleviate the credibility problem
facing the policy-makers. In economies where there are on-going structural
distortions -whether due to labour markets or tax systems- all central bank
independence achieves is shifting the burden of revenue raising from in￿ ation
to other sources such as taxation or borrowing.
It must be noted, however, that there are other channels through which
CB independence may have a favourable impact on domestic debt markets.
For instance, a successfully functioning independent CB enhances the over-
all credibility of macroeconomic policies and may thereby induce a greater
interest in government securities. The nature of the actual link between
CB independence and the borrowing conditions is ultimately an empirical
question and would depend upon which e⁄ect dominates in practice.
4 The Extended Model: Impact on the Private
Sector Credit
The framework developed above has so far maintained that the banking
sector can only invest in government bonds. Although this simpli￿cation
helps to highlight the interactions between government policy and the ￿-
18nancial sector, it ignores the possibility of a ￿nancial crowding-out where
government borrowing replaces private borrowing in the banking sector￿ s
loan portfolios. Given the lack of ￿nancial depth in emerging market and
other developing countries crowding-out remains to be relevant for these
economies with potentially serious economy-wide consequences (see, for ex-
ample, Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004 and Christensen, 2005).17
In order to analyze the role of public borrowing on the availability of
credit to private sector and the macroeconomic implications of this rela-
tionship, this section extends the above developed model by allowing the
possibility of banks￿lending to the private sector.
4.1 Financial crowding-out
The banking industry now competes both for the sources of funds and for














t denote the private sector demand for borrowing from bank i;
rli
t is the loan rate charged by bank i, r
lj
t is the vector of loan rates charged
by all other banks and Al, " and   are all positive parameters that relate to
the structure of the credit market.


















where all variables are as de￿ned earlier.
Bank i now chooses the deposit rate; r
zi
t ; the loan rate; rli
t and the
demand for public sector bonds; bi
t to maximize its pro￿ts in (24).




t (in t = 1), re-arranging the











17The term ￿ ￿nancial depth￿refers to the total supply of funds available in an economy





































1 in (24) and utilizing the relation lT
1 = n li
1
we can establish that the total bank credits to the private sector amounts
to lT
1 = Al ￿ "rl
1.
Result 8. A rise in public sector borrowing from the banking sector re-
duces the scope of bank lending to the private sector. Moreover, the lower
the ￿nancial depth, the greater the crowding-out.
Proof 8. It is straightforward to establish that a rise in d1 reduces the
total bank credits to the private sector, lT
1 since both @rl
1=@r1 = "+n2
n2+2" and
@r1=@d1 are unambiguously positive and @lT
1 =@rl
1 = ￿" is unambiguously
negative; thus @lT
1 =@d1 < 0.
Given that advanced and emerging economies di⁄er in their ￿nancial
depth which is lower in the latter, the size of the crowding-out tends to
be greater in emerging market countries. Clearly, in economies with lower
￿nancial depth, a given rise in public borrowing leads to a greater rise in
interest rates, that is both @r1=@d1 and @rl
1=@d1 are greater in size. It,
therefore, straightforwardly follows that the fall in private sector lending
will be greater in such economies.18
18Indeed, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) have shown that crowding-out is sys-
tematically larger in emerging market countries. Christensen (2005) also provides support
for the signi￿cant size of crowding out in less developed countries.
204.2 Implications of credit availability
Having established the existence of ￿nancial crowding-out, we now turn to
its implications. The notion that credit availability impacts upon real eco-
nomic activity has long been recognized.19 One channel through which the
availability of credit a⁄ects the functioning of an economy is through its
impact on productivity. Existing evidence suggests that there is a strong
relationship between productivity growth and the share of total domestic
credit received by the private sector (see, for example, King and Levine,
1993). Our model developed above provides a suitable framework to es-
tablish this link between supply of credits, productivity and real activity.
In what follows, therefore, we modify our benchmark model to explore the
implications of variations in credit availability and thus of crowding-out gen-
erated by a rise in public borrowing.
Now consider the following form of the production function: Yt = b AtN
￿
t ,
where b At represents the level of productivity in period t: The representative
competitive ￿rm￿ s problem is to maximize pro￿ts Pt(1 ￿ ￿t) b AtN
￿
t ￿ WtNt,
as above. The representative ￿rm chooses labor to maximize pro￿ts by
taking Pt,Wt and ￿t as given. The resulting output supply function is yt =
￿(pt + 1
￿b at ￿wt ￿￿t)+z, where, as above, lower case letters represent logs.
Given the productivity enhancing role of credit provision, b at could be
written as follows:
b at = b a0 + ￿lT
t (29)
where lT
t is the level of total bank credits to the private sector as de￿ned
earlier, b a0 is a constant and positive productivity parameter and ￿ > 0:
Substituting b at into the modi￿ed output supply function, normalizing
output by subtracting the constant term z0 = z+￿b a0=￿ for simplicity yields
the following modi￿ed output supply function:
xC
t = ￿(￿t ￿ ￿e
t ￿ ￿t + ￿lT
t ) (30)
where xC
t denote output supply in the presence of the credit availability
e⁄ect and ￿ = ￿
￿:Superscript C is used for values in the presence of credits
to the private sector.
The relationship between credit availability to the private sector and the
macroeconomic performance is formalized by Result 9 (Appendix C lists the
19See, Calomiris and Hubbard (1989), for example, for evidence from the US.
21modi￿ed macroeconomic outcome in the presence of credits to the private
sector).
Result 9. A fall in credit availability to the private sector is associated
with a worse economic outcome in terms of higher in￿ation and lower output
both in current and future periods.
Proof 9. It is straightforward to show @￿1=@lT




1 = ￿￿(1 + r1) ￿2
￿1
e ￿￿ are both unambiguously negative and
@xC
1 =@lT
1 = ￿(1 + r1)￿2
￿ e D￿￿ and @xC
2 =@lT
1 = ￿(1 + r1)￿2
￿
e ￿￿ are both un-
ambiguously positive.
An important question regarding the modi￿ed version of the model that
needs to be addressed here is whether our earlier results, Results 1-7, re-
main valid in the presence of bank lending to the private sector and the
favourable e⁄ects of credit availability on output supply. Characterizing the
equilibrium as in Section 2 by utilizing the extended model suggest that Re-
sults 2-7 continue to hold as before. Result 1, establishing the relationship
between the competition in the banking sector and the terms of borrow-
ing now holds for su¢ ciently low characterization of credit demand by the
private sector. Intuitively, otherwise a rise in the number of banks do not
necessarily translate into greater demand for government securities.20;21
Regarding the impact of CB independence on the scale and the terms
of public borrowing, as established by Result 7 above, bank lending to the
private sector in fact reinforces the earlier ￿nding of an unfavourable impact
of CB independence. This is because, a given rise in the borrowing require-
ment under an independent CB reduces the availability of private sector
credits and thus equilibrium output in this case. The fall in output, in turn,
induces the government to cut back on taxes which would partly be ￿nanced
through further borrowing. When combined with the direct impact of CB
independence on the borrowing requirement, this indirect e⁄ect would raise
the cost of borrowing even further.
5 Conclusions
This paper has developed a theoretical framework to analyze the role of the
banking sector on domestic debt dynamics in emerging market countries
20Formally,
@b1










2 + (￿ + n1)4￿) + "]r1; where ￿ =
(n2+2")2
 "(n1+2￿)2:
21Due to space limitations, the full set of results in the extended version of the model
are not provided in the paper. All results are available from the authors upon request.
22where banks are dominant intermediaries in the government securities mar-
ket. This is done by explicitly incorporating the pro￿t maximizing behaviour
of the banking sector into a game-theoretic macroeconomic policy-making
model. This framework is then utilized to examine the determinants of the
terms of public borrowing. Combining the features of the ￿nancial sector
with the policy￿ making structure enables us to provide a fuller account of
the cost of domestic borrowing especially in emerging market countries.
Our analysis provides a set of interesting results. We show that the cost
of domestic borrowing is determined by the ￿nancial characteristics of the
banking sector as well as by macroeconomic and institutional factors. More
speci￿cally, our analysis reveals that the more competitive the banking sec-
tor and the more liquid and deeper the deposit market, the better would be
the conditions in the public securities market. Our results also suggest that
the lower the ￿nancial depth, the greater the public borrowing￿ s crowding-
out of lending to the private sector. To the extent that credits to the private
sector are associated with improved productivity and better output perfor-
mance, the lack of ￿nancial depth in emerging market countries implies that
extensive domestic borrowing in these countries may have consequences far
beyond the concern with ￿scal sustainability.
In addition to the features of the ￿nancial sector, macroeconomic and
institutional factors play a crucial role in the dynamics of domestic borrow-
ing. Our analysis indicates that countries with high levels of existing debt
are more likely to face unfavorable terms in issuing new borrowing. We
have also shown that where political instability is an inherent part of the
policy-making environment there is likely to be a bias towards debt accu-
mulation with potentially serious consequences for the cost of borrowing.
More interestingly, we show that the greater the independence and the con-
servativeness of the central bank the greater the pressure on the terms of
government securities.
A general policy implication of our work is that it is essential to de-
velop domestic debt markets, a proposition often voiced in the aftermath
￿nancial and especially currency crises. For example, in the wake of crises
in East Asia and Russia one policy measure regularly put forward was the
improvement and enhancement of internal debt markets in the crisis-prone
countries. Our analysis reinforces this view by suggesting that developing
domestic debt markets would not only provide potentially less volatile alter-
native to external borrowing but would also improve the ￿scal environment
in which policy-makers operate, with bene￿cial economy-wide consequences.
One potential extension of our framework would be the consideration of
foreign borrowing which is excluded from our analysis. In the presence of
23external borrowing, policy-makers would switch between di⁄erent sources
of debt depending upon the relative cost of borrowing. However, given the
volatility of capital ￿ ows to emerging market countries, the structure of
￿nancial sector in these economies would continue to play a major role in
shaping the debt dynamics.
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26Appendix A Deriving the Outcome in t=1
Di⁄erentiating (13) w.r.to ￿1;g1 and d1 yields the following ￿rst order
conditions:
￿￿(￿(￿1 ￿ ￿e
1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ x1) = ￿1 (A1)
￿2(g1 ￿ g1) = ￿1 (A2)
(1 + r1)￿G￿2 e D(x2=￿ + g2 + (1 + r1)d1) = ￿1 (A3)
Imposing the rational expectations condition (i.e. ￿e
1 = ￿1), and com-
bining the resulting equations with the ￿rst order conditions from the CB￿ s
loss minimization, the budget constraint and output supply function, yields
the equilibrium outcome in t = 1: Equilibrium borrowing, d1 is presented in
the text. Equilibrium values of the other variables are listed in the following
table.
Table A1- Equilibrium Outcome in t = 1:
g1 = (1 ￿ ￿)g1 ￿ e D￿￿[g2 + 1
￿x2 + (1 + r1)( 1
￿x1 + (1 + r0)d0)]
￿1 = ￿2
￿1
e D￿￿[g2 + 1
￿x2 + (1 + r1)(g1 + 1
￿x1 + (1 + r0)d0)]
x1 = ￿￿2
￿ [ e D￿￿[g2 + 1
￿x2 + (1 + r1)(g1 + (1 + r0)d0)]] + (1 ￿ ￿2
￿2￿)x1
￿ 1 = ￿2
￿2[ e D￿￿[g2 + 1
￿x2 + (1 + r1)(g1 + (1 + r0)d0)]] + ( ￿2
￿2￿ ￿ 1) 1
￿x1
Note: ￿ = e D￿￿(1+r1) where (1￿￿) > 0 , (1￿ ￿2
￿2￿) > 0 and all other
parameters are as de￿ned in the text.
27Appendix B Solving for r1
Equilibrium in the bond market suggests that d1(r1) = b1(r1): As derived
before, the government￿ s borrowing requirement is given by






x2 + (1 + r0)d0] (A4)
which can be expressed as
d1 =
[H ￿ (1 + r1)JB]
(1 + (1 + r1)2J)
(A5)
where H = g1 + (1=￿)x1 + (1 + r0)d0; J = ￿FA( e D=e ￿) and B = g2 +
(1=￿)x2.
Similarly the total demand for bonds is given by
b1 =
[(c￿2 + !(n ￿ 1)c￿n)￿2 + (n ￿ 1)n2! + 2n￿]r1 + (￿ + (n ￿ 1)!n)cA￿
c(!(n ￿ 1)n + 2￿)
(A6)
which can be more simply expressed as
b1 = C + Mr1 (A7)
where C = [(￿ + (n ￿ 1)!n)cA￿]=[c(!(n ￿ 1)n + 2￿)] and M = [(c￿2 +
!(n ￿ 1)c￿n)￿2 + (n ￿ 1)n2! + 2n￿]=[c(!(n ￿ 1)n + 2￿)]
In equilibrium Ed
1 = d1 ￿ b1 = 0, thus
[H ￿ (1 + r1)JB]
(1 + (1 + r1)2J)
￿ [C + Mr1] = 0 (A8)
Multiplying both sides of this equation by (1 + (1 + r1)2J) yields
[H ￿ (1 + r1)JB] ￿ [C + Mr1](1 + (1 + r1)2J) = 0 (A9)
28(A9) can be expressed as
￿￿1r1
3 ￿ ￿2r1
2 ￿ ￿3r1 + ￿4 = 0 (A10)
where ￿1 = JM;￿2 = J(2M + C);￿3 = M + (M + 2C + B)J and
￿4 = H ￿ (B + C)J ￿ C:
Solving (A10) for r1 and restricting the solution range to non-negative
values yields the equilibrium bond rate.
Appendix C Macroeconomic Outcome in the Extended Model
Equilibrium values of in￿ ation, output and public borrowing in the ex-
tended model are listed in Table A2.





￿x2 + g2) + (1 + r1)(g1 + 1





e ￿￿[g2 + (1 + r1)(g1 + 1
￿x1 + (1 + r0)d0 ￿ ￿lT
1 )] + (1 ￿ ￿2
￿2e ￿￿)x2
dC
1 = ￿[g1 + 1
￿x1 + (1 + r0)d0 ￿ ￿lT





e D￿￿[g2 + 1
￿x2 + (1 + r1)(g1 + 1




￿ [ e D￿￿[g2 + 1
￿x2 + (1 + r1)(g1 + (1 + r0)d0 ￿ ￿lT
1 )]] + (1 ￿ ￿2
￿2￿)x1
Note: e ￿ = 1
(1+e ’); e ’ = ￿2
￿2+ k￿2






; e D￿ = (1+r1)￿FA e D;
z = (1 + e ’) e D￿;￿ = 1
1+(1+r1)z;￿ = e D￿￿(1 + r1). Also, (1 ￿ ￿) > 0;
(1 ￿ ￿2
￿2￿) > 0 and (1 ￿ ￿2
￿2e ￿￿) > 0:
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